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Abstract
Economic theory needs a stronger defence against unwise application of mathematics.
Mathematicians are trained for abstract thought and not for empirical science. Their contribution
can wreak havoc, for example in education with real life pupils and students, in finance by
neglecting real world risks that contribute to a world crisis, or in voting theory where they don’t
understand democracy. In 1951 the mathematician Kenneth Arrow formulated his Impossibility
Theorem in social welfare theory and since then mathematicians have been damaging democracy.
My book Voting Theory for Democracy (VTFD) tries to save democracy and social welfare from
such destruction. VTFD applies deontic logic to Arrow’s Theorem and shows that Arrow’s
interpretation cannot hold. The editor of a journal in voting matters has VTFD reviewed by a
mathematician instead of a researcher who is sensitive to economics, democracy and empirical
issues. Guess what happens. The review neglects economics, democracy and empirical issues.
Curiously it also neglects the argument in deontic logic, perhaps given the distinction between
mathematics and logic. Given the importance of democracy it is advisable that economists study
the situation and rethink how economics and mathematics interact in practice.
Introduction
This paper is a response to the review of Voting Theory for Democracy (2011a) (VTFD) by
Markus Schulze (2011) (MSR). I have submitted this response to the editor and he has responded
in a friendly and constructive manner, in the spirit of Leibniz: let’s sit down and check the
formulas. Nevertheless, the MSR has already been published. The MSR is unscientific. It
contains errors, misrepresentations and fallacies. The text was not presented to me in draft so that
there was no opportunity to suggest corrections. It is a “review” rather than a review. Hence, I
agree with the editor and accept his invitation but in the mean time it is advisable to state my
response.
It is useful to see this matter in the light of the current economic crisis and the role of
mathematicians in science and society. The MSR is another case of mathematical blindness to
social and empirical science. Schulze has studied mathematics and physics at TU Berlin and
developed his own voting scheme but is not necessarily well positioned to understand the
application of voting theory to democracy. It is curious that MSR does not really discuss VTFD
chapter 9 on the mathematics of voting theory and the application of deontic logic (the logic of
norms).
Economics relies on mathematics. In this dependence there is a problematic role of
mathematicians who are trained for abstract theory and who are less disciplined by reality. A key
example is the current economic crisis. Mathematicians and “rocket scientists” designed financial
2products without sufficient attention for the risks in the real world. Banks collapsed when risks
materialized that theory had neglected. Of course, politicians, misguided fellow economists and
law makers, greedy bankers and lax overseeers were as important in the cause of the crisis. But
the misapplication of mathematical abstraction to the real world was important too. This
blindness plays an important role in voting theory as well. The misapplication of mathematics
goes against democracy, always, in a fundamental sense. If you cannot calculate or reason then
you are pretty defenceless in the market place or against rosy promises by political candidates.
But it is more complicated. See Elegance with Substance (2009) how mathematicians, trained for
abstract theory, wreak havoc in the education in mathematics when they meet real life pupils and
students. In addition, a population that has learned to hate mathematics is less likely to adopt a
spirit of democracy.
The context of this paper is my book Definition & Reality in the General Theory of Political
Economy (2011b) (DRGTPE). The update to this 3
rd
 edition concerns a chapter on the current
economic crisis, that was expected in some form or other. The main thesis of DRGTPE is that our
system of democracy of the Trias Politica with the separation of powers of the Executive,
Legislative and Judiciary branches fails, and that we need an amendment for an Economic
Supreme Court that is based in science. World War I and II already are sufficient arguments and
hopefully the world can prevent World War III. One part in DRGTPE contains a discussion of
Arrow’s 1951 Impossibility Theorem in the theory of social welfare. This part finds a further
development in the separate book Voting Theory for Democracy.
Common views in voting theory contain many errors. This is bad for democracy. It is difficult to
have proper democracy when you misunderstand what democracy means. Some of those errors
already occur at the most basic level, some are at a high level of abstract mathematics, and again
a third kind exists in the verbal interpretation of abstract mathematics. A correction of these errors
is urgently needed. In my experience these errors have become such a strong mixture at the
academia that a refoundation of voting theory applied to democracy is required. Voting Theory
for Democracy was written with this objective. It starts with a foundation for democracy and then
develops the notions in voting theory while avoiding common errors and pointing out what those
common errors are.
Since Arrow’s Theorem in 1951 – mind you, sixty years ago – researchers in voting theory have
ample information for the design of better voting mechanisms. Society however still uses archaic
methods that are rather undemocratic, also for the selection of the very leaders of our
“democratic” nations. It is not just that law makers neglect the advice of scientists, but it are also
researchers in voting theory who create the errors that VTFD is a cure for.
And now this MSR “review” blocks the cure. Now VTFD is misstated itself. This misstatement
has been published on the internet, to be found by everyone with an interest in voting theory. This
MSR misrepresentation may stop people from considering the corrections to common errors in
voting theory. VTFD warns about the role of misguided mathematicians, but the editor has given
the task of reviewing to a misguided mathematician.
It is a field of inquiry itself how people select their sources and whom they assign value to. The
authority assigned to a mathematician with a degree from TU Berlin may cause people to
disregard an analysis by someone with a degree in econometrics from the University of
Groningen and a degree in the teaching of mathematics from the University of Leiden. According
to MSR, my mathematical development in chapter 9 is only “mumbo-jumbo”. This is unscientific
nonsense and my impression is that he did not really study it.
3The editor of Voting Matters, Nicolaus Tideman, has responded in a kind manner to an earlier
version of my present response. Indeed, with Leibniz, let us sit down and reason. I will accept
that invitation but it is important to note that there are limits. The problem is not just formulas but
also the interpretation how to apply them to the world. There are limits to what one can achieve in
getting a mathematician to see the world. See the next section on the MSR “core error”. I have
written VTFD precisely to allow people to understand the argument but if they stubbornly refuse
to study it then there seems little that can be done.
Professor Tideman apparently did not ask: “Did you check with the author ?” Perhaps editors
don’t have to do so when they can rely on competence and scientific mores. In this case the
“review” uses hard language like “mumbo-jumbo” that ought to have rung alarm bells. Will
Schulze correct his text now that he has committed himself so unconditionally ? Since he did not
present his hard language draft for comments and thus does not understand the basic notion of
decency and truthfulness in science, we may fear the worst. Will Voting Matters publish a
correction, withdraw this “review” and ask someone else to try again ? Will the McDougall Trust
show itself an institute of integrity or will it allow itself to become a vehicle in the corruption of
scientific inquiry ? Only time will tell. Professor Tideman’s kind invitation to look at the
formulas is a hopeful sign but for now science and democracy have been damaged again and it is
hope only.
I invite scientists over the world to look at this. The PDF of VTFD has been available on the
internet since 2001 and the analysis is of key importance for democracy. Check the analysis and
help to resolve the situation.
To be sure: technical issues on voting schemes can be separated from issues on the current crisis,
from issues on constitutional amendment, and from the role of mathematicians. But Voting
Theory for Democracy is not a book on mere voting schemes. When scientists advise on what is a
good voting scheme then values and considerations on real life people and real economies are
relevant. Good mathematics is of value too, but it are also values what we might advise for a good
society and a good life for all. That said, and also given that the reviewer is a mathematician, a
main response with respect to MSR is that it neglects the mathematics and deontic logic in
chapter 9.
The core error
Given that Schulze is a mathematician, his core error is his statement:
“The author’s criticism of Arrow’s theorem (which covers about one fourth of this book)
is just mumbo-jumbo.”
If only he had looked more carefully at chapter 9 on my mathematical treatment. Only 9.1 and 9.2
ought to be sufficient to understand the importance of VTFD, with its new contribution to the
theory of social welfare and voting.
VTFD accepts the mathematics of Arrow’s theorem but rejects the interpretation that is suggested
by Arrow and that has been adopted by many researchers in voting theory. Chapter 9 casts this
interpretation into mathematics itself and it shows via deontic logic that Arrow’s interpretation
cannot be maintained consistently. VTFD is the only book in the world that properly explains
what Arrow’s theorem means. Everyone with middle school can already understand it but it now
4has been put into formula’s so that also mathematicians can understand it, provided that they look
at it.
As a student in econometrics in Groningen I had courses in mathematics together with the
students in math, physics and astronomy. My mathematics is quite decent. When I noted the
errors in Arrow’s interpretation of his theorem and noted how insensitive mathematicians are to
notions of democracy when it comes down to their formulas, it was a deliberate act to translate
that interpretation into mathematics, and to expose the inconsistencies, in the language that
mathematicians ought to understand: logic.
However, Schulze apparently does not look deeply into chapter 9, dodges the issue, and refuses to
face up to the problem. He does not do a proper review.
Details on the first section of the “review”
(1) MSR’s abstract suggests that VTFD is a “primer”. It is not. A primer is a book for teachers.
VTFD is a textbook for first year students or other adult novices to voting theory, that also
contains some advanced material. It explicitly asks students to first study the first chapters, then
look into other books, and then proceed with the more complex parts of VTFD. There is no need
that I copy what has been stated elsewhere. It is curious that MSR criticises me for not copying.
The value of VTFD lies in its focus on democratic application and on the proper interpretation of
Arrow’s theorem. The News.
(2) On the Introduction in VTFD, MSR states: “Unfortunately, there are no formal definitions for
preferences, orderings, single-seat elections, etc.” No, of course not. VTFD is not a course in
mathematics. It is intended for students in general, with some command of mathematics and
logic. The Introduction develops notions that are relevant for understanding democracy. The
formal treatment for advanced readers is in chapter 9. After reading some other books, the
students will understand chapter 9 too.
The use of the environment of Mathematica, a system for doing mathematics on the computer,
should not distract and suggest that VTFD is a book on mathematics. People can drive a car
without being mechanics. The use of Mathematica is just to take away the tedium of all these
voting calculations, and, indeed, to also provide support in “driving” through voting theory.
(3) VTFD holds that the paradoxes in voting theory are caused by the possibility that people can
cheat (“strategic voting”). MSR’s “objection” is a non-sequitur. Everyone is free of course to
have another analysis but a non-sequitur is not convincing.
(4) In VTFD the term “budget” stands for the list of available items (candidates), as distinct from
the whole domain of all potential possibilities. What is available depends upon rules. Often
people have to declare themselves candidate but there are also cases where people are not allowed
to dodge their responsibility. The discussion in VTFD on the budget is intended to clarify to
students the importance of its creation. MSR does not seem to understand this and produces a
convoluted statement that I actually don’t understand. He then suggests that my terminology
merely replaces Arrow’s term of “irrelevant alternatives” with “availability”. This is a
misunderstanding. There is a cognitive distinction between dependence upon the budget and
Arrow’s specific axiom of pairwise decision making (that Arrow misleadingly calls
“independence of irrelevant alternatives”, see point 7 below). Perhaps in some particular
instances it is hard to pinpoint the distinction, but in general there is a cognitive distinction.
5One might think that Arrow’s terms present a glass as half empty while my terms present it as
half full. But this misrepresents the argument. When a President visits a kindergarten and reads a
story about Santa Claus and tells the kids that Santa Claus lives in the North Pole, a newspaper
might run the headline “President still believes in Santa Claus”. This is fallacious.
The value of VTFD lies in both a distinction and a link between the mathematics and the choice
of words. Arrow’s interpretation causes statements on the impossibility of democracy and the
unavoidability of some form of dictatorship. But his terms are misleading. The mathematics of
Arrow’s theorem is sound but the interpretation is wrong. And this is proven in deontic logic in
chapter 9.
(5) About chapter 5, MSR states: “The author’s use of some terms differs significantly from their
use in the scientific literature.  This leads to misunderstandings when, for example, the author
concludes that “plurality voting can violate Pareto optimality” (page 70).”
MSR’s statement is definitely wrong. The notion of Pareto optimality is well established in
economic theory. VTFD presents the Pareto voting scheme where each voter can veto items that
are worse than the Status Quo. Clearly Plurality can violate that when it neglects that veto.
One of Arrow’s axioms departs from Pareto optimality. It is generally called “weak Pareto
optimality”. It is unclear how a student of VTFD could get confused since these two notions are
well indicated in VTFD. Or how someone who knows the literature could get confused. Perhaps
MSR himself gets confused. Perhaps he bases himself upon a limited and wrong section of the
literature ?
(6) About chapter 7 on Elo-Rasch rating, MSR states: “There is no analysis of these schemes.”
This is a curious statement since the chapter itself is such analysis.
Mathematically inclined researchers in voting theory nowadays tend to focus on classifying
voting methods in all kinds of properties. Example properties are “monotonicity” and
“independence of clones”. Nobody knows why such properties would be important since there is
no way to compare or balance them. This process of classification is primarily an academic
activity, but it is something that mathematicians can do to keep themselves busy. In this way they
avoid looking at reality and application to democracy. Now MSR has the criticism that this would
be lacking in a book directed at application for democracy. He has been so trained and focussed
on something of lesser relevance that he is incapable to consider what the book is about.
He misrepresents what VTFD is intended for. He tries to fit a big square block into a small round
hole. Mathematical developments of Elo-Rasch rating abound, see any decent volume on
psychometrics. The discussion in VTFD is intended to help clarify cardinal utility, in relation to
cheating, and to establish the generality of the dependence on the budget, also in soccer matches,
and even in cricket. Soit.
(7) About chapter 9-10, MSR questions my solution to Arrow’s paradox. Everyone is free to
question my proposed solution. Indeed, criticism is even welcome, I know, big surprise, that I am
not perfect. But this ought to be reasoned, and not a mere sneer. MSR: “At one point, the author
“solves” Arrow’s theorem by rejecting  independence of irrelevant alternatives as unreasonable.”
Well, clearly, Arrow’s axioms are inconsistent, so everyone will have to reject one axiom or
other. My choice to reject IIA is reasoned. And its name is misleading. We better call it “axiom of
pairwise decision making”, which combines two aspects: the reduction of the budget to pairs and
6the confusion of voting vs deciding. Unfortunately, MSR has not properly studied VTFD and
cannot appreciate these fine points.
MSR: “At another point, the author “solves” Arrow’s theorem by keeping the election method
undefined in the case of circular ties.” This is a “Santa Claus” misrepresentation. A cycle in
pairwise voting actually is an indifference in terms of decision making. Much of Arrow’s theorem
depends upon the phenomenon that there is no universal method to resolve indifference or
deadlocks. We may flip a coin or leave it to the chairperson or whatever. In deterministic
mathematical theorems and proofs it is not standard to introduce such non-deterministic coin
flipping. VTFD gives a very clear  explanation of this phenomenon. I invite readers to check how
MSR’s sneering wholly misrepresents this insight.
Borda Fixed Point method
(1) MSR in section 2: “A serious problem of this book is that the author spends too much time
introducing his own pet method: the “Borda Fixed Point” (BFP) method. This method has neither
been published nor adopted somewhere.  Even this book doesn’t contain a proper analysis of this
method. So why should we be interested in software to calculate the winner of the BFP method?”
(a) I did not know that I had a pet. I created the BordaFP since I consider it somewhat weak to
merely reject Arrow’s interpretation of his theorem without offering an alternative. It is better to
constructively forward a scheme instead of leaving students helpless in the woods. VTFD
discusses various standard schemes such as Pareto, Plurality, Borda, Condorcet, and, based upon
this, I developed my own suggestion of BordaFP. (b) The method was published in the first
edition of VTFD in 2001. As far as I know it is not adopted by others yet but it has not gotten
much circulation. (c) Again MSR abuses the words “proper analysis”. Perhaps the addiction to
classification again, as if that would be so very useful ? (d) The method is fully encoded in the
software. Mathematica is a high level programming language that makes no real distinction
between formulas and programming. So why try to make a distinction that isn’t there ? (e) Below
we meet the Kemeny-Young and Tideman methods, and MSR indicates that they use a similar
criterion as the BordaFP method. So he is inconsistent.
(2) MSR gives a complex statement of the “basic idea” of my design of the BordaFP method,
which I however do not agree with. I don’t think that VTFD explains the method unclearly, but
MSR now invents some procedure that seems to based upon some misunderstanding. When I
submitted VTFD to Voting Matters for a review I also offered a licence for the reviewer to run the
software. This option was not used.
I have run the software. Case 1 is 51 abcde, 49 cdeba, with the first most preferred, and the
BordaFP winner is also the Borda winner c (and not a as MSR holds). Case 2 is 51 afbcde, 49
cdefba, and the BordaFP winner is f while Borda gives c. In the competition at the top, f also wins
from c in the pairwise comparison, while c is the winner when f does not partake.
(3) MSR: “The author claims that the BFP method satisfies the majority criterion. But example #2
shows that it doesn’t.” This appears to concern p77 of VTFD where I thought to have proven that
BordaFP also gives the Majority Plurality winner. Schulze shows that this is not true, indeed.
This observation is something to be grateful for since it is only by this kind of criticism that we
make advances. I will include an erratum on the website and adapt the software so that the
ParetoMajority scheme includes a check on finding the Majority Plurality winner.
7NB. VTFD is very careful about the use of the term “majority”. It appears that the term is very
vaguely used in everyday language and that interpretations can change upon circumstances.
VTFD takes the position that the voting literature increases the confusion by introducing some
apparent strictness while it is absent in general conversation. For example, President Sarkozy of
France was elected by “majority”, as the general public, press and politicians hold, and he likely
thinks himself too. But the system had two rounds. The BordaFP and even Borda and Condorcet
winner was Bayrou, who would have beaten both Sarkozy and Royal also in pairwise contests,
but who dropped out in the first round that used plurality. My impression is that voting theory
needs to communicate with the general public, press and politicians, and grant that President
Sarkozy indeed was elected by a majority in some sense. The voting literature tends to restrict
“majority” to plurality with more than 50% with respect to all alternatives. I prefer Majority
Plurality as a better technical term for this case. Hence the term “majority”in VTFD is used a bit
more flexible, such that the user is always encouraged to be aware what it actually means in that
particular instance.
(4) MSR refers to methods by Kemeny-Young and Nicolaus Tideman and states that these also
satisfy: “where a newly added candidate x can win only if he pairwise beats that candidate who
would be elected if candidate x didn’t run. So the problem that Colignatus addresses has already
been solved in the scientific literature.”
(a) Well, this contradicts the earlier criticism “why should we be interested?” (point (1) in this
section above). Or MSR wants to have textbooks that only present new material ?
(b) Subsequently, MSR rejects the criterion and proposes another. First of all this is a value
judgement. Secondly, using the internet I see that Schulze has developed a method himself,
known under the “Schulze method’, that apparently is used in organizations like “Wikimedia”.
But his list of references does not refer to his own work, so perhaps the criterion he suggests does
not relate to his own work, and he intends to revise his method ? Anyhow, this “review” episode
is the first time that I hear about this “Schulze method”, and I am not in the position to say
anything on it. I neither understand his quick comment upon which he bases his value judgement,
and why it would be an important criterion.
(c) For the sake of history, allow me to clarify that I stated my criterion in Colignatus (1990), a
paper at the Dutch Central Planning Bureau while oblivious of Kemeny-Young or Tideman. My
paper in 1990 was directed at debunking misunderstandings about Arrow’s Theorem and not at
developing a specific voting method. I mentioned the criterion then only as a rather obvious one,
since while writing the notion popped up and it always remains useful to record an idea. The
criterion is not exactly for a “newly added candidate” but more accurately: that the supposed
winner W should also be able to win directly from the alternative supposed winner that comes
about when W would not participate. Only when composing the first edition of VTFD in 2001 I
decided to apply that notion to Borda, to create the BordaFP procedure, as a constructive
contribution next to the debunking of misunderstandings. The method allows students to see
Borda and Condorcet in perspective. It forms some sort of compromise, though it was not
developed as a compromise. Given the intentions of VTFD there has never been the intention to
provide a compendium of all of voting theory. MSR’s comment is the first time that I hear that
others have attached much value to the criterion as well (or a similar criterion). Fine. The beauty
of internet nowadays is that there is fast access to references, though it remains difficult to
understand what authors intend precisely. At this moment I cannot state how BordaFP differs
from Kemeny-Young or Tideman (or, indeed, where those methods differ themselves).
8With respect to the MSR summary
Given the above, the MSR summary has no base. The suggestion that there is no “formal
definition of election methods” is absolutely untrue, see chapter 9. I also protest against the
slanderous use of language. The MSR is unscientific, wrong and apparently incompetent as well.
A communication gap
Economists partake in a social science and seem to attach great value to Arrow’s mathematics
and his Nobel Prize. Mathematicians seem to want formulas only and get nervous when voting
theory is discussed for social application. Econometrics deals with both worlds. It optimally
meets with the benefits of both but it can also meet with the drawbacks of both. In the latter case,
there appears to be no tolerance and no rational discussion. The innocent person who suggests
another point of view instantly meets with canon fire from all directions. In practice, voting
theory for democracy has fallen into that gap since 1951, and for me personally since 1990, and
the world suffers from it.
In informal discussion the directorate of the Dutch Central Planning Bureau referred to Arrow’s
Impossibility Theorem to block research into social welfare. This caused me to write the paper
(1990) to clarify many misunderstandings about the theorem, but this analysis was blocked from
discussion and publication, with unclear reasons.
When discussing voting theory and Arrow’s theorem since 1990 this problem in communication
occurs over and over again. Next to CPB and MSR:
(a) a Dutch research group on social choice who blocked a discussion and did not study an
earlier edition of VTFD, http://www.dataweb.nl/~cool/Thomas/English/Science/Letters/SCT-
working-group.html
(b) a European network of researchers advising the European Union to use Penrose square root
weights, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3885/
(c) Donald Saari and his suggestion that Borda would be the best mechanism because of
mathematical symmetry, see (a)
(d) Steven Brams and his suggestion that Approval Voting would be the best mechanism because
it is Approval Voting, http://econwpa.wustl.edu/eprints/get/papers/0503/0503014.abs
(e) wikipedia’s entries on social choice,
http://www.dataweb.nl/~cool/Thomas/English/Science/Letters/2006-03-20-Comments-
RfC.pdf
(f) the curious 2011 UK referendum on AV, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22782/
(g) the Dutch journal for teachers of mathematics that rejected the article “With time no
morality” in Dutch that was published in the Dutch journal for teachers of economics,
http://www.dataweb.nl/~cool/Thomas/Nederlands/Wetenschap/Artikelen/2008-2011-
Euclides-over-ZonderTijdGeenMoraliteit.html
(h) a Dutch mathematician who “explains” Arrow’s theorem on the network for Dutch
highschools and who claims that ideal democracy is impossible. After two years mulling it
over he recently seems willing to correct but it is not entirely sure that he will do so correctly.
As an example, the mathematicians in (h) “explains” to Dutch school kids that “perfect
democracy → Arrow’s axioms → impossibility”, while the theory of morals suggests “perfect
democracy → the system should function → not Arrow’s axioms”. It is a world of difference.
9I seem to have developed some toughness over time but for other scientists this CPB – Schulze –
(a) – (h) treatment would be both painful and deathly for their career. It is a stable of Augias. My
suggestion is that true scientists with roots in both empirics and mathematics clean it.
Conclusion
In responding to the Schulze “review” it is tempting to focus on voting issues only. The text
appeared in a journal devoted to voting matters and the issue might be settled there. However, it
is not guaranteed that it will be settled there and given the unscientific treatment in first instance I
have reason to doubt that it will. Trust comes on feet and leaves on horse-back. The kind
invitation by the editor to look at the formulas is reason to give this the benefit of the doubt, and
there we stand. Where we should have been in the first place, but damaged. Given the role of
mathematicians in other areas like finance and education there is a good argument to raise the
discussion towards a higher and more general level. Economic theory needs a stronger defence
against unwise application of mathematics.
This voting issue may be a good place to start and grow aware of the problem. Again: I invite
scientists over the world to look at this. The PDF of VTFD has been available on the internet
since 2001 and the analysis is of key importance for democracy. Check the analysis and help to
resolve the situation.
Of course, and in particular on the economic crisis in which our notions of democracy play such
an important role: it are economists who provide our governments with economic advice, and the
overall responsibility about our advice remains with the profession.
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